IRATE Court Rulings

The process of amending the U.S. Constitution was designed to be challenging. The framers of the Constitution recognized that to become part of the foundation of our system of jurisprudence, an idea or proposition must have sufficient support within the fabric of our society to overwhelm all question or controversy.

The goal of the national Move to Amend movement is to pass a 28th amendment to the Constitution to affirm that corporations do not have rights of personhood and that the freedom to spend unlimited amounts of money to influence the public discourse is not guaranteed by the first amendment. We have our work cut out for us.

For one thing, there is relatively little public understanding even of what “the rights of personhood” means, let alone why continual Court recognition of corporate rights of personhood has significantly undermined the foundations of Democracy in our society. In addition, although more Americans are inherently outraged by unlimited spending in political campaigns, the First Amendment guarantee of free speech is so valued that when the Court applies that freedom to buying messaging in elections (as it did in Citizens United v. FEC) a large number of Americans abandon their outrage and feel that free speech trumps “too much money in politics.”

The Santa Clara County affiliate of Move to Amend is developing a program to provide tools for activists and engaged citizens to raise public awareness and support for our 28th amendment. The goal is to break down natural objections and misperception by simplifying issues and making concrete connections between corporate rights of personhood/unlimited political spending and the steady diminution of the rights of ordinary people in favor of powerful corporations. This process is largely one of translating seemingly obscure legal details into lay terms in a way that speaks in a gut way to mainstream America's sense of fairness and morality.

We decided to borrow from the common methodology of analysis within the legal profession and community known as IRAC (Issue, Relevant Law, Application of Facts, Conclusion). We us the analysis methodology of IRAC to examine court cases that best exemplify the pernicious effects of the affirmation of corporate rights and the right to unlimited political spending. We expand the Conclusion portion of IRAC to focus on the legal Transformation generated by the ruling and the resulting Effect on real people. The result is the encapsulation of representative court cases in a format that we call IRATE. The IRATE analyses that follow are presented in concise, one-page formats. The abstract analysis presented for each case is augments with a Story. This Story paragraph is meant to humanize the Effect of the ruling, depicting a specific experience either of a real person or of an archetypal person caused by the ruling. We hope to use IRATE one-page summaries as tools to make the harmful effects of years of court rulings real and understandable, with a goal of raising the ire of mainstream America. The IRATE analyses that follow are preliminary, and have not been completely vetted for absolute accuracy and validity. They are presented as examples and are meant to create a foundation for a robust set of tools to raise awareness and generate broad mainstream support for our 28th amendment.

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How to Use an IRATE Case Analysis / Summary

We recognize that an IRATE analysis does not stand by itself to materially affect an average uninitiated citizen. Rather, the target audience for these one page summaries is at least three-fold.

Activitists

The information presented in an IRATE analysis should be used by Move to Amend activitists to craft stories, pictures, and other materials to speak to the emotions of ordinary people. Legal specifics contained in the Issue, Relevant Law, Application of Facts sections should at most be summarized in a few words (if at all). Even the Transformation section is likely to be too abstract to make a compelling emotional appeal to a non-initiate. The Effect section, augmented by the Story provides the basis on which to create that emotional appeal.

Educators

The information presented in an IRATE analysis can be presented to educators to provided historical and legal details behind important court cases. In particular, the Issue, Relevant Law, Application of Facts sections provide context for a productive educational discussion that is much broader than just legal perspective. An educator should be encouraged to use an IRATE analysis as a springboard to further, more in-depth research into the specific case, or even into the overall issues of corporate constitional rights and the association of political spending with free speech.

Legislators

The information presented in an IRATE analysis is a valuable tool in raising awareness and overcoming objections of government officials who are approached to support our 28th amendment. All sections of the analysis are relevant and can be expanded on to give political “cover” for a vote in favor of a proposition in support of the Move to Amend cause.

As more work is done on this project, there will be refinements to its structure and the list of target audiences will similarly evolve.

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Vision and Disclaimer About These IRATE Case Summaries

The purpose of these IRATE Supreme Court case summaries is for educational purposes, to make these Supreme Court cases understandable and accessible, and to start discussions of the issues that these cases raise.

These IRATE Supreme Court case summaries are not an end in themselves. These IRATE summaries are the starting point for discussion. They are intended to assist people in thinking about the influence that the Supreme Court has had on our political system in creating the concept of Corporate Personhood by giving corporations rights and protections under our Constitution.

These IRATE Supreme Court case summaries have been written by all volunteer effort.

If you have a different understanding of these cases, please share it with others by starting a Forum Discussion on our website.

If you think that there is a factual error in any of these summaries, then please let us know. We'll research the issue. If we need to make a correction, then it will be made in the next edition of the IRATE document with a note that a correction has been made.

Please remember to be respectful in all discussions.

Following are the instructions for how to start a new forum discussion:

www.scc-mta.org

Go to the Working Groups pulldown tab,

Go to the the Communication pulldown tab,

Click on Discussion Forum

Click on Log in to post new content in the forum.

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IRATE Project

Table of Cases of Supreme Court Case Summaries

Organized by Human Needs

Privacy Needs & Rights

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Safe Community & Right to Protect the Children in our Communities

Lorillard Corp. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)

Safe Community & Safe Environment

Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)

Safety & Security of our Homes

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)

Reasonable Working Conditions --- Living Wage & Reasonable Working Hours

Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)

Safe Community / Health, Safety and Well-being of the people

Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, (1945)

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IRATE Project

Table of Cases of Supreme Court Case Summaries

Organized by Constitutional Amendment or Provision

Corporation's First Amendment Free Speech Rights --- Commercial speech

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. ___ (2011)

Lorillard Corp. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)

Corporation's Fourth Amendment Rights --- Warrant Searches / Inspections

Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)

Corporation's Fifth Amendment Rights --- Takings Clause --- Regulatory Taking

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)

Corporation's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause Rights

Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)

Corporation's Commerce Clause Rights

Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, (1945)

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Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of District of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)

In Adkins the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal minimum wage legislation for women and children was an unconstitutional infringement of the corporate and individual liberty of contract as protected by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Issue: Can Congress establish minimum rates of wages for women in the District of Columbia?

Rule: The right to contract about one’s affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual protected by the due process clause of the 5th amendment.

Application: In 1918 Congress passed a law establishing a minimum wage for women and children in Washington D.C. A board of three members representing employers, employees, and the public was constituted to set standards of minimum wages in the different occupations in D.C., to determine “what wages are inadequate to supply the necessary cost of living to any such women workers to maintain them in good health and protect their morals”.

The Supreme Court argued that the D.C. legislation amounted to a price-fixing law; it is impossible to know the true cost of a necessary minimum wage; “the relation between earnings and morals is not capable of standardization”; the necessities of the employer are ignored; the 19th amendment has empowered women already as of 4 years earlier; and if this is allowed then Congressional power could be used to set a maximum wage, unthinkable.

In the landmark Supreme Court case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Supreme Court held that “liberty of contract” was implicit in the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. The Court rejected a New York law limiting the number of hours a baker could work each day to ten, and limiting the number of hours that a baker could work each week to 60, saying it was an “unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right and liberty to contract”.

Transformation: The liberty of contract implied for corporations and individuals in the 5^th Amendment must be applied to strike down minimum wage laws for women and children in Wash. D.C. In balancing the power of Congress to regulate the health and safety of Washington D.C. female residents against the right of corporate and individual persons to contract at will, the health and safety standards of real persons take second place. The general rule forbids legislative interference with the freedom of corporations and individuals to make contracts. The “common good…of society as a whole cannot be better served than the preservation against arbitrary restraint of the liberties of its constituent members.”

Effect: Fixing minimum wages for Washington D.C. women from $9 to $16.50 per week is unconstitutional. Female and corporate persons are “free” to contract for higher or lower wages.

Fictional Representational Story: I am Barbara Jackson, an African American apprentice laundry worker at Smith & Jones Laundry in Washington DC. The year is 1923. For the past 9 months I have been receiving $9 per week to work long, hot, tiring days cleaning laundry for corporate hotel clients. On April 20, 1923 I was told that I would have to negotiate my weekly wage directly with my boss at the Smith & Jones Laundry, because the day before (on April 19) the Supreme Court said I could no longer receive this already meager amount for my labor. I have been told I will need to take an $1.50 cut per week, making it impossible for me to provide shelter, food, and clothing for my three children.

Written by: Richard Hobbs

Disclaimer: These IRATE summaries are for educational purpose only.

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Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, Attorney General Of Massachusetts, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)

In Lorillard, the Supreme Court held that the Massachusetts regulations that prohibited smokeless tobacco or cigar advertising within 1,000 feet of a school or playground violated the tobacco corporation's first amendment free speech (commercial speech) rights.

Issue: Does the Massachusetts' cigarette advertising and sales practices regulation for tobacco products (cigarette, smokeless tobacco, and cigar) violate the First Amendment?

Rule: Massachusetts' outdoor and point-of-sale (indoor) advertising regulations relating to smokeless tobacco and cigars violate the First Amendment.

Application: Massachusetts created comprehensive regulations governing the advertising and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars. The outdoor advertising regulation prohibited smokeless tobacco or cigar advertising within 1,000 feet of a school or playground to keep the advertisements generally out of range of children. The indoor, point-of-sale advertising regulation prohibited smokeless tobacco and cigar advertisements lower than 5 feet from the floor of a retail establishment located within 1,000 feet of a school or playground to keep the advertisements generally out of range of children's sight.

For commercial speech to come within protection of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court applied the 4 part test from Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commission of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, at 566.

1) whether the expression must at least concern lawful activity and not be misleading,

2) whether the asserted governmental interest must be substantial,

3) whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,

4) whether the expression is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.

The Attorney General of Massachusetts presented studies, one from the FDA, in which the Surgeon General's report and the Institute of Medicine's report found that "there is sufficient evidence to conclude that advertising and labeling play a significant and important contributory role in a young person's decision to use cigarettes or smokeless tobacco products."

However, the Supreme Court ruled that the outdoor advertising regulations are invalid under the fourth step of the Central Hudson analysis. The Supreme Court ruled that the indoor advertising regulation on the height of indoor advertising is invalid under Central Hudson's third and fourth prongs. The Supreme Court concluded that the sales practices regulations withstand First Amendment scrutiny.

Transformation: Corporations can spend massive amounts of money to advertise products, including dangerous products such as cigarettes and other tobacco products, even to children, not only to adults.

Effect: Massachusetts state law regulating cigarette advertising was invalidated which gives corporations the right to target advertising tobacco products to children. The effect is that the tobacco industry can advertise in such as way as to target children in order to create more tobacco consumers.

Fictional Representational Story: I'm Sally McGovern. Last month my 28 year old daughter, Cindy, was diagnosed with lung cancer. Cindy started smoking when she was in junior high school. The Attorney General had presented a study in court that showed children as young as ages 3 to 6 recognized "Joe Camel," the cartoon symbol for Camel brand cigarettes. After the introduction of Joe Camel, Camel cigarettes' share of the youth market rose from 4% to 13%. The state of Massachusetts passed a law that said the cigarette companies couldn't advertise within 1,000 feet of schools, but the case went to the Supreme Court and they overturned the state law. It's just not right. I don't want other youngsters and their parents to go through what we're going through worrying if our daughter is going to still be alive in a few years.

Written by: Judy Young

Disclaimer: These IRATE summaries are for educational purpose only.

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Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)

In Marshall, the Supreme Court held that, based on the fourth amendment, OHSA inspectors must obtain a warrant before inspecting business premises. Enforcement of OSHA or other regulatory standards is severely weakened since the requirement to get a warrant removes the element of surprise and allows a corporation to temporarily fix violations.

Issue: Are warrantless searches of business premises under Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?

Rule: The Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause protects commercial buildings as well as private homes.

Application: Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) empowers agents of the Secretary of Labor to search the work area of any employment facility within OSHA's jurisdiction. The purpose of the search is to inspect for safety hazards and violations of OSHA regulations. No search warrant or other process is expressly required under OSHA.

Ferrol G. Barlow, president and general manager of an electrical and plumbing installation business, refused to allow an OSHA inspector to enter the nonpublic area of the business because no complaint had been filed against the business and because the OSHA inspector did not have a search warrant.

The Secretary of Labor argued that warrantless inspections are reasonable under the 4th Amendment, that an exception be made to the search warrant requirement for industries that are closely regulated, warrantless inspections are essential to the proper enforcement of OSHA due to the advantages of surprise, and requiring a warrant for OSHA inspections will cause warrantless-search provisions in other regulatory statutes to also become unconstitutional. The Supreme Court rejected all four arguments.

The Supreme Court ruled that OSHA Section 8(a) is unconstitutional because it authorizes inspections without a warrant. The OSHA inspector's concerns are not sufficient to justify warrantless inspections under OSHA. A warrant would provide assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria.

Transformation: Corporations cannot be inspected on a surprise basis and thus may temporarily alter or disguise a myriad of safety details that could lead to unsafe working conditions for employees or to unsafe conditions for the community in which the corporation is conducting its business.

Effect: OSHA was designed to protect employees from unsafe working conditions and to protect the community from harm or damage that corporations might cause due to their primary legal obligation to make a profit and thus to cut costs in its business operations.

Fictional Representational Story: I'm Henry Jones and I work for ABC Corp. They make forklifts. My supervisor makes us remove the safety devices from the machines that we use to stamp out metal parts for the forklifts. He says that the safety devices slow down our work and we make less parts for the assembly department. Sometimes, inspectors from OSHA come to inspect our plant for health and safety violations. When our supervisor gets word that one of those inspectors is on his way, he yells “Hailstorm coming!” We all know that's code that means we are to stop our work and put the safety devices back in place. After the inspector leaves, we take the safety devices off again. The inspector says that I can report safety violations, but I'd lose my job if I did. Last year, my co-worker, George, got his index finger on his right hand cut clean off by the stamping machine because the safety guard was not in place. He was out of work for 3 months and his family really struggled to make ends meet while he was out of work.

Written by: Judy Young

Disclaimer: These IRATE summaries are for educational purpose only.

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Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)

Petitioner Mahon purchased a home in Scranton, PA in the early 20th century. The Pennsylvania Coal Company (PCC) had acquired rights to subsurface mining over a large area of Scranton, including Mahon’s property, through a general deed acquired by the company in 1889. Damage to Mahon’s home had ensued from a mine collapse under his property. He sued PCC, the case went to the Supreme Court, which found in favor of the coal company.

Issue: To what extent shall corporate contracts and land title provisions be upheld when corporate action results in damage to third parties? And to what extent should the property rights of a corporation be respected when they conflict with general corporate regulatory law enacted by a state to protect its citizens and environment?

Rule: Amendment 5, “...nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...” But what exactly is the “due process of law” that this requires? And must this clause apply to corporations exactly as to persons?

Application: Petitioner Mahon purchased a home in Scranton, PA in the early 20^th century. A clause buried in his title deed contained a general right to mine coal under Mahon’s property by Pennsylvania Coal Company. That clause also made PCC blameless should subsistence or collapse of the surface property occur as a result of subsurface mining.

Similar situations in the state caused the PA legislature to enact a statute (earlier, in 1921) that forbids any mining operation from causing subsistence of surface land, with certain exceptions. Implied by that statute was the abrogation of any general deed clauses making mining blameless for surface subsidence damage. Mahon sued PCC under that statute and won in the PA Supreme Court. PCC appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Court found the PA statute unconstitutional, finding for the PCC in this case, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).

The majority opinion essentially argued that Mahon was bound by the provisions of his title deed, which transferred all risk of subsidence due to subsurface mining to him, the owner, leaving the mining company blameless. The court found that provision of the new Pennsylvania law unconstitutional, as it failed to adequately compensate any mining corporation for its loss of property rights. Those rights were written into the general mining deeds acquired by PCC in 1889. Any damage to surface homes due to subsurface mining could not therefore be laid to the mining company, as that would be an illegal “taking” of property without compensation.

The implication is that a state may not impose new regulatory statutes that impose new costs on certain corporations without adequate compensation for those costs. In this case, the PCC had the foresight to acquire a general mining right under most of the city of Scranton, and to write a provision into every title deed subsequently acquired. The Court found that that right constituted a “property” of the corporation and that this property was protected against an arbitrary “seizure” by the state. Enacting the 1921 statute amounted to the “taking” of certain corporate property rights by the state of Pennsylvania without due compensation.

Transformation: The ability of a corporation to acquire general property rights, including those acquired decades earlier, and to preserve those rights against subsequent state regulatory action, was upheld under this decision. A corporation far sighted enough to acquire a general subsurface mining deed in the nineteenth century, cheaply, and to hold it essentially forever, binding future surface property owners to it, could profit from that, albeit at the expense of those foolish enough to acquire surface property.

Effect: A state is powerless to regulate corporate damage to third parties, unless the corporation is suitably compensated for the negative effect of the regulation. Ancient mining laws in particular are upheld regardless of their deleterious effect on the present citizens and their properties. In effect, a corporation is protected under the fifth amendment against an “arbitrary” taking of its property, however and whenever those property rights were acquired.

Fictional Representational Story: Mary purchased a home in a coal region of Pennsylvania. Her home began to subside, requiring expensive repairs to the structure. She discovered that a coal company has been mining under her property, and that a large section of the mine had collapsed. She read her title papers with care and discovered that a clause permits subsurface mining under her property, and that the mining company must be held blameless for any surface damage caused by the mine. This is in spite of a state statute forbidding any coal company from causing such damage, whether or not a general property deed protects the coal company. Under this Supreme Court ruling, she is unable to recover damages from the mine, and she eventually lost her home to subsidence of the land.

Written by: William Barrett

Disclaimer: These IRATE summaries are for educational purpose only.

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Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. ____ (2011)

In Sorrell, the Supreme Court invalidated Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Law ruling that it violated the First Amendment rights of the association of pharmaceutical manufacturers. The Vermont law provided that, unless physicians consented, pharmacies and health insurance companies could not sell to pharmaceutical companies, for marketing purposes, information about what drugs the physicians had been prescribing to their patients for which diseases and conditions.

Issue: Does a law that restricts access to information in nonpublic prescription drug records violate of the First Amendment?

i.e. Can a state prohibit the nonconsensual sale of doctors’ prescribing information contained in nonpublic prescription drug records, or is such a restriction an improper infringement on the free speech of pharmaceutical companies?

Rule: Speech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing is a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

Application: Background: Pharmaceutical manufacturers promote their drugs to doctors through a process called "detailing." This often involves a scheduled visit to a doctor's office to persuade the doctor to prescribe a particular pharmaceutical. Detailers bring drug samples as well as medical studies that explain the "details" and potential advantages of various prescription drugs. Knowledge of a physician's prescription practices—called "prescriber-identifying information"—enables a detailer better to ascertain which doctors are likely to be interested in a particular drug and how best to present a particular sales message.

Facts of the Case: In 2007, Vermont enacted the Prescription Confidentiality Law which prohibited pharmacies, health insurers, and similar entities from selling regulated records containing prescriber-identifying information to be used for the marketing of pharmaceuticals, absent the prescriber's consent. State attorney general William H. Sorrell was sued by three Vermont data miners and an association of pharmaceutical manufacturers that produce brand-name drugs claiming that their first Amendment rights to free speech were being violated. The Supreme Court agreed.

The court's reasoning and ruling: Vermont has imposed a restriction on access to information in private hands, e.g. "a case in which the government is prohibiting a speaker from conveying information that the speaker already possesses." An individual's right to speak is implicated when information he or she possesses is subjected to "restraints on the way in which the information might be used" or disseminated, violating their First Amendment rights as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, because the law did not specifically forbid the use of this information for other than marketing purposes." Vermont's law imposes a content-and speaker-based burden on respondents' own speech. That consideration requires heightened judicial scrutiny"

Transformation: Because the drug retailers are required by law to keep records of prescription sales, physicians prescription histories are essentially open to data-miners and pharmaceutical manufacturers who then use this information to target them for often high-pressure sales tactics to convince them to prescribe certain expensive brand name drugs rather than less expensive bio-equivalent generic alternatives.

Effect: Physicians prescription histories can be sold to data-miners for the purpose of marketing.

Fictional Representational Story: I am a Vermont State legislator who has been fighting to protect medical privacy, including physician confidentiality, avoidance of harassment, and the integrity of the doctor-patient relationship. Our law also was intended to improve public health and reduce healthcare costs. This has been ruled unlawful by the U.S. Supreme Court. We contend that prescription histories are a commodity and that our law regulates not speech but simply access to information. Without this law, we cannot stop the sale of doctor's prescription records to drug manufacturers who use this information for their own gain.

Written by: Anne Pflager

Disclaimer: These IRATE summaries are for educational purpose only.

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Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945)

In Southern Pacific, the Supreme Court invalidated an Arizona state law that regulated the length of trains, limiting train length to 14 passenger or 70 freight cars, created for greater safety for the people of Arizona.

Issue: Does a state law limiting the length of railroad trains contravene the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution?

Rule: In determining whether state regulations affect interstate commerce, the Supreme Court adopted a new approach, to wit, the balancing test replaced the rational basis test.

Application: The Arizona Train Limit Law of May 16, 1912, made it unlawful for any person or corporation to operate within the state a railroad train of more than 14 passenger cars or 70 freight cars, and authorized the state to recover a money penalty for each violation of the Act. The purpose of the legislation was to minimize accidents by reducing the lengths of trains passing through the state.

In 1940, the State of Arizona brought suit in the Arizona Superior Court against the Southern Pacific Company to recover the statutory penalties for operating within the state two interstate trains, one a passenger train of more than 14 cars, and one a freight train of more than 70 cars. The company admitted the train operations, but defended on the ground that the statute contravened the U.S. Constitution and conflicted with federal legislation.

The Supreme Court adopted the findings of the Arizona trial court, based on the findings of fact submitted to it by the railroad. These findings were that the operation of trains of more than 14 passenger and more than 70 freight cars was standard practice over the main lines of the railroads of the United States.

The Supreme Court changed its approach and used a balancing test, rather than the rational basis test. The Court concluded that the state interest is outweighed by the interest of the nation in an adequate, economicaland efficient railway transportation service, which must prevail. The Court invalidated the Arizona law.

Transformation: In the 1938 case, South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell, the Supreme Court upheld a state law that prohibited trucks from using state highways whose width exceeded 90 inches and whose weight exceeded 20,000 pounds. The Court used the rational basis test, which is the type of judicial review that is most deferential to the legislature. However, by 1945, the Supreme Court replaced the rational basis test approach with the balancing test approach. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, the Court declared unconstitutional a state law that limited train length to 14 passenger or 70 freight cars under the new balancing test which balanced the cost of compliance with the state law and affect on interstate commerce against the safety regulations in the state law. The Court distinguished the earlier ruling in Barnwell by noting the differences between railroads and highways. However, as Erwin Chemerinsky states in 'Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies' on page 442, that this “distinction is questionable because there is a national interest in the free flow of both trucks and trains.”

Effect: This balancing test that the Supreme Court created allows the Court to balance the cost to the company or corporation implementing safety procedures against the health and safety of the community in which the regulation was created. The standard of judicial review was changed from the Court giving deference to legislature (rational basis test) into taking away the right of the people of a community or state to decide what level of safety they want their legislators to create (balancing test).

Fictional Representational Story: I and my husband are residents of Phoenix. Our house is within ten feet of a rail line. We are accustomed to trains passing by our home night and day, but are disturbed that the length of the trains seems to have increased over the years. We know of several accidents elsewhere in the U.S. and are frankly terrified of the possibility of a major accident not only destroying our house but taking our lives with it. We are not pleased that the Supreme Court has taken the regulation of train length and other safety issues from our state jurisdiction. The federal standards are too low, in our opinion. That case has also almost surely reduced the market value of our beautiful home.

Written by: Part by Tom Shaw and part by Judy Young

Disclaimer: These IRATE summaries are for educational purpose only.

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Comments

Submitted by Judy Young on Thu, 2012-07-12 07:48

Great job to all the volunteers!

All the volunteers who contributed to writing summaries for this IRATE document have done a wonderful job! I hope the lots of people will read these summaries and will add thoughtful comments.

IRATE Court Rulings

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